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Introduction
People with mental health problems are stigmatised and in particular there is concern about
stigmatisation in employment3. The Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (“the Act”) was introduced to
address the problems of disabled people, both in employment and in the provision of education, goods
and services4 and the legislation is concerned with mental as well as physical health.  However, its basic
premise is that disability has to be long-term and must be defined in terms of the individual disabled
person. Many people with mental health problems are not disabled within the meaning of the Act, and
because of the individualised approach what has been described as institutionalised discrimination has
not been addressed5. This article examines the current employment protection for those with mental
health problems offered by the Act and elsewhere. It will be argued that there are particular problems
associated with mental health that are not addressed by the current law and that recent attempts to
address these have resulted in a missed opportunity, and that a more radical approach is necessary because
of the nature of mental health and the perceptions and prejudices surrounding this area. 
PART I – DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION
History of disability discrimination in the UK
Although it would probably not have been thought of as a piece of anti-discrimination legislation, the
Disabled Persons (Employment) Act 1944 was, for 50 years, the only legal vehicle, not for the prevention
1 This is the second article by the author published in the
Journal of Mental Health Law about mental health in the
workplace. The first was published in the May 2006 issue,
pp 53–65.
2 Reader in Law, Nottingham Law School, Nottingham
Trent University.
3 See J Read and S Baker Not Just Sticks and Stones: 
A Survey of the Stigma, Taboos and Discrimination
experienced by People with Mental Health Problems
(1996, London: Mind), and G Thornicroft  Shunned –
discrimination against people with mental illness (2006,
Oxford: Oxford University Press).
4 This protection came into force in a staggered timetable 
in 1996, 1999 and 2004. For a comprehensive account 
of disability discrimination see B Doyle, Disability
Discrimination: Law and Practice, (2005, Bristol:
Jordans).
5 See the Disability Rights Commission website at
http://www.drc-
gb.org/library/policy/employment/drc_short_briefing_on_eq
ualit.aspx
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of discrimination, but for a rather crude acknowledgement that there should be some concession made
towards disabled people and work. The legislation provided for a form of positive discrimination in the
form of a quota for disabled workers in any employment undertaking and a number of reserved
occupations6. The Act repealed this and set up a new structure of protection for disabled people in an
attempt to address the growing concern7 that disabled people were suffering from difficulties in obtaining
employment and from prejudice once they managed to find their way into the workplace. 
Following the passing of the Act in 1995, the Government published Towards Inclusion8 and set up the
Disability Rights Taskforce. The Disability Rights Commission published its review following the
recommendations of the Taskforce9. Legislation was also passed to provide for a Disability Rights
Commission (“the DRC”)10. Subsequent to the 1995 Act the EC Framework Directive 2000/78/EC was
issued.11 A number of amendments have been made to comply with the Directive, principally made by the
Disability Discrimination (Amendment) Regulations 2003 and the Disability Discrimination Act 2005. The most
significant of these are the abolition of the following: the requirement that any mental impairment must
result from a clinically well-recognised illness;12 the exemption for employers with fewer 15 employees,13
and the justification defence available to employers if there was a failure to make reasonable adjustments14.
Most notably, the Act has also been amended to provide that people with HIV, cancer or multiple sclerosis
are deemed to be disabled at the point of diagnosis15. However, arguably there are still areas of non-
compliance with the Directive, perhaps most significantly in the context of the statutory obligation to
make reasonable adjustments to accommodate disabled workers16. This is explored further below.
The current structure of disability discrimination in the UK
There are some basic concepts in discrimination law in the UK that are common to the various forms of
anti-discrimination provisions. There are two forms of discrimination: direct and indirect. Direct
discrimination is where there is less favourable treatment because of the person’s sex or other protected
characteristic. Indirect discrimination occurs when a provision, criterion or practice (such as a mobility
clause or a certain standard of English) is applied to everyone but which has a disparate impact upon
6 One significant impetus for this legislation was the effect of
the Second World War (see, e.g. A Borsay, Disability and
Social Policy in Britain since 1750 (2005, Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan) pp 133–138).
7 In addition at the end of 1993 the United Nations
Standard Rules on the Equalisation of Opportunities for
Persons with Disabilities were adopted by the United
Nations (General Assembly Resolution 48/96). However,
the concern had been present for a long time. In 1976 the
Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation
published a strongly worded account of the link between
poverty and disability: Fundamental Principles of
Disability (1976, London: UPIAS) p 14.
8 Department of Education and Employment, Towards
Inclusion – civil rights for disabled people (2001,
Department of Education and Employment). 
9 Disability Rights Commission, Disability Equality: Making
it happen (2003, Disability Rights Commission).
10 Disability Rights Commission Act 1999.
11 This was complemented by Council Directive
2000/43/EC which established the principle of equal
treatment between persons regardless of racial or ethnic
origin (gender discrimination had already been dealt with
by the Equal Pay Directive (EC/75/117)and the Equal
Treatment Directive (EC/76/2070.  
12 Removed by section 18 Disability Discrimination Act
2005.
13 Disability Discrimination (Amendment) Regulations 2003
SI 2003/1673, Reg 7.
14 Ibid Reg 4. In any event the defence was otiose as since
the law only requires reasonable adjustments to be made,
any justification defence would necessarily entail a finding
that the employer was being unreasonable.
15 Section 18 Disability Discrimination Act 2005.
16 See K Wells, “The Impact of the Framework Employment
Directive on UK Disability Discrimination Law” (2003)
32 No 4 ILJ 253, and L Waddington, “Implementing the
Framework Employment Directive: Room for Exercising
National Discretion” in A Lawson and C Gooding (eds)
Disability Rights in Europe (2005, Oxford: Hart) p 107.
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those who come within the protected group. However, this form of discrimination can be justified by the
employer in circumstances where it can be shown that the provision, criterion or practice of the employer
is proportionate to the legitimate needs of the undertaking17.
Direct discrimination
The Disability Discrimination Act 1995 protects against direct discrimination only18. Direct discrimination
is unlawful inasmuch as an employer cannot use the fact of disability as a ground for treating someone
less favourably, but less favourable treatment can be meted out for a reason which relates to the
disability19. This is a distinction of excessive subtlety, and a distinction that would not be tolerated in the
context of sex and race discrimination20.
Direct discrimination is defined as less favourable treatment when the relevant circumstances of the
disabled person and another person (real or hypothetical21) without that particular disability are not
materially different. The discrimination can be justified if there is a reason that is both material to the
circumstances of the particular case and substantial,22 and the justification will only stand if no reasonable
adjustment can be made23.  
Reasonable adjustments
UK disability discrimination law is unique in the canon of legislation that offers protection against
discrimination in that there is no provision to protect against indirect discrimination. The reason for this
was that it was thought that there would be no need for indirect discrimination provisions because of the
duty to make reasonable adjustments would render them unnecessary24. However, Bell is arguably correct
in saying that if employers are mindful of a prohibition on direct discrimination, the more likely they are to
move away from this and towards indirect forms of discrimination25. Furthermore, some employers at least,
may well review their needs if they know that they are vulnerable to an indirect discrimination challenge.  
The fact that indirect discrimination is not prohibited is only somewhat ameliorated by the obligation
upon the employer to make reasonable adjustments to accommodate disabled workers. In some respects
the language of the Act mirrors some of the language of the other discrimination legislation in relation to
indirect discrimination26. However, as Wells has argued, the obligation to make reasonable adjustments
17 Sex Discrimination Act 1975 ss 1 & 3, Race Relations
Act 1976 s 3, Disability Discrimination Act 1995 section
1 and Schedule 1, Employment Equality (Sexual
Orientation) Regulations 2003 Reg 2, Employment
Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 Reg 2, and
Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006 Reg 3.
18 Disability Discrimination Act 1995 section 3A. The Act
also makes it unlawful to subject a disabled person to
harassment for a reason relating to their disability (ss 3B
and 4).
19 Section 3A(1), (4) and (5).
20 See e.g.  the sex discrimination case of Webb & Emo Air
Cargo Ltd [1996] 2 CMLR 990, ECJ.
21 The comparator must be someone who has no disability or
a different kind of disability or a hypothetical person based
upon evidence of others who have been treated differently
in broadly similar circumstances (see Disability
Discrimination Act 1995 Code of Practice: Employment
and Occupation, 2004, paras 4.12–4.18).
22 Section 3A (3).
23 The Court of Appeal held that the correct approach in
deciding whether direct discrimination is justified is
whether the employer has carried out a proper risk
assessment, and as long as they have, then its decision will
be unassailable unless it is actually perverse, which looks
very much like the inappropriate introduction of public law
principles Jones v Post Office [2001] IRLR384.
24 HC Deb Standing Committee E co 142.
25 M Bell, “Sexual Orientation Discrimination in
Employment: An Evolving Role for the European Union”
in R Wintemute and M Andeaes (eds) Legal Recognition
of Same-Sex Partnerships, (2001, Oxford: Hart) p 659.  
26 Section 4a of the Act states: (1) Where – (a) a provision,
criterion or practice applied by or on behalf of an
employer, or (b) any physical feature of premises occupied
by the employer, places the disabled person concerned at a
substantial disadvantage in comparison with persons who
are not disabled, it is the duty of the employer to take such
steps as is reasonable, in all the circumstances of the case,
for him to have to take in order to prevent the provision,
criterion or practice, or feature, having that effect.
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does not oblige an employer to take preventative measures and “leaves no scope for a claim relating to an
anticipated disadvantage”27. By way of contrast Article 2(2)(b) of the Directive28 does specifically refer
to measures that “would” place a disabled person at a disadvantage. Justification of such measures is
permitted under the Directive, but the measure must be objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the
means of achieving that aim are proportionate and necessary29. Another shortcoming of the Act is the
specific provision that if the employer cannot be reasonably expected to know of the need for an
adjustment this is a defence to an action under section 4A30.
The interaction between direct discrimination and reasonable adjustments has been summed up as
meaning that the justification defence to an allegation of direct discrimination will not be made out if
there has been a failure to comply with a section 4A reasonable adjustments duty31. Section 18B of the
Act sets out the matters to which regard shall be had in deciding whether an employer has complied with
the duty, and there is a very clear emphasis upon cost32.
However, Wells argues that in European law ‘reasonableness’ means effectiveness33. This is clearly at odds
with the cost effective approach of the Act. Fredman has argued that if the employer does not pick up
the cost of adjustments then that cost does not disappear; it will either fall on some other third party or
the disabled individuals themselves34. Although many employment protection measures give rise to issues
of cost, there is a compelling argument that this is a necessary price to pay for the cost of inclusion of
people with disabilities35.
27 K Wells, “The Impact of the Framework Employment
Directive on UK Disability Discrimination Law” (2003)
32 No 4 ILJ 253, at 271.
28 EC Framework Directive 2000/78/EC.
29 Article 2(2)(b)(i).
30 Section 4A (3).
31 See Baynton v Saurus Ltd [2000] ICR 375, and
Chaudhery v London Borough of Newham [2003] WL
1935409. Arguably the section 4A duty introduces an
element of positive discrimination although it is suggested
that this is really a form of positive action., as it does not
treat disabled people more favourably but seeks to level the
playing field.  
32 Section 18B states:
(1) In determining whether it is reasonable for a person to
have to take a particular step in order to comply with a
duty to make reasonable adjustments, regard shall be had,
in particular, to-
(a) the extent to which taking the step would prevent the
effect in relation to which the duty is imposed;
(b) the extent to which it is practicable for him to take the
step;
(c) the financial and other costs which would be incurred
by him in taking the step and the extent to which taking it
would disrupt any of his activities;
(d) the extent of his financial and other resources;
(e) the availability to him of financial or other assistance
with respect to taking the step;
(f) the nature of his activities and the size of his
undertaking;
(g) where the step would be taken in relation to a private
household, the extent to which taking it would-
(i) disrupt that household, or
(ii) disturb any person residing there.
(2) The following are examples of steps which a person
may need to take in relation to a disabled person in order
to comply with a duty to make reasonable adjustments-
(a) making adjustments to premises;(b) allocating some of
the disabled person’s duties to another person;
(c) transferring him to fill an existing vacancy;
(d) altering his hours of working or training;
(e) assigning him to a different place of work or training;
(f) allowing him to be absent during working or training
hours for rehabilitation, assessment or treatment;
(g) giving, or arranging for, training or mentoring (whether
for the disabled person or any other person);
(h) acquiring or modifying equipment;
(i) modifying instructions or reference manuals;
(j) modifying procedures for testing or assessment;
(k) providing a reader or interpreter;
(l) providing supervision or other support.
33 K Wells “The Impact of the Framework Employment
Directive on UK Disability Discrimination Law” (2003)
32 No 4 ILJ 253 at 264.
34 S Fredman, Disability Equality and the Existing Paradigm,
p 210, in A Lawson and C Gooding (eds) Disability
Rights in Europe, (2005, Oxford: Hart).
35 Legislation that protects e..g. pregnant women, may result
in extra cost and inconvenience for employers but as the
House of Lords stated in Brown v Stockton-on-Tees
Borough Council [1988] 2 WLR 935, it is the price to be
paid for the equal status of women in the workplace; the
same must be true of the equal status of disabled people.
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The employer’s duty to make reasonable adjustments only arises if, otherwise, the worker is at a
‘substantial’ disadvantage. The word ‘substantial’ has a wide range of meaning and “takes colour and
meaning from its surroundings”, but it was held that it does not have to be more than “worthy of
consideration for the purposes of the Act” and  that it is not equivalent to “considerable, solid or big”36. 
Definition of disability 
The issue as to what it means to be ‘disabled’ is central to this article. Disability is defined under section
1 of the Act as a physical or mental impairment which has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on
his ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. This has to be read in conjunction with Schedule 1
of the Act that deals with specific conditions that will qualify the person as being disabled and, in other
cases, with what is meant by ‘long-term effects’ and ‘normal day-to-day activities’. Long term means that
it has lasted for 12 months, or is likely to last for 12 months or for the rest of the life of the person
concerned. Normal day-to-day activities are affected for the purposes of the Act only if the impairment
affects one of the following: mobility; manual dexterity; physical co-ordination; continence; ability to lift,
carry or otherwise move everyday objects; speech, hearing or eyesight; memory or ability to concentrate,
learn or understand, and perception of the risk of physical danger37. The meaning of normal day-to-day
activities was given a commendably wide interpretation in Paterson v The Commissioner of Police of the
Metropolis38 where it was held that carrying out an examination or assessment (in this case, the internal
assessments carried out by the police for the purposes of promotion through the ranks) is a normal day-
to-day activity. The European Court of Justice has considered the concept of disability thus: “Directive
2000/78 aims to combat certain types of discrimination as regards employment … the concept of
‘disability’ must be understood as referring to a limitation which results in particular from physical, mental
or psychological impairments and which hinders the participation of the person concerned in professional
life”39. Arguably this definition is more satisfactory because it removes the need to decide upon whether
a day-to-day activity is impaired and replaces it with an emphasis upon the applicant’s ability to undertake
work, which should be the key issue under consideration in an employment disability discrimination
claim.
A recommendation made by the Disability Rights Commission in 200340 that the ability to communicate
should be one of the criteria and that self-harming behaviour should be included has not been adopted.
Certain conditions will qualify as imparting a disability without more, and they are: severe
disfigurement,41 cancer (with the proviso that regulations can be made to disapply the ‘automatic’
designation of disability in certain cases of cancer), HIV and multiple sclerosis42. The inclusion of severe
disfigurements is interesting because they are rarely disabling in the common sense of the term and are
not life-threatening, and yet there is an automatic assumption that they will have a substantial adverse
effect on the ability of the person concerned to carry out normal day-to-day activities. It is unfortunate
36 See Disability Discrimination Act Code of Practice:
Employment and Occupation, 2004 para 4.6 and A v
London Borough of Hounslow [2001] Emp LR 1255
EAT at para 54.
37 Para 4 of Schedule 1 of the Act.  
38 [2007] UKEAT 0635_06_2307.
39 Chacon Navas v Eurest Colectividades [2006] IRLR
706, para 43.
40 Disability Rights Commission, Disability Equality: Making
it happen (2003, Disability Rights Commission) p 60.
41 Para 4 of Schedule 1. ‘Severe’ is interpreted in relation to
its degree and the visibility of the disfigurement (see
Guidance, Part II, para A17). Disfigurement caused by
tattoos is excluded, but Doyle suggests that disfigurement
caused by an attempt to remove a tattoo would not be
excluded, nor would disfigurement caused by self-harm 
B Doyle, Disability Discrimination: Law and Practice,
(2005, Bristol: Jordans), p 28.
42 Para 6A of Schedule 1.
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that the statutory framework requires the effect on the ability to carry out day-to-day activities (i.e. what
might be called the ‘functional’ formula) to be mentioned at all because it is fictitious in the case of most
severe disfigurements, particularly because, as Doyle says: “This is a rare example of the legislation
acknowledging a social model of disability rather than a purely medical one”43.
The issue of recurring impairments is dealt with in section 2(2) of the Act. If the disability in the past has
had a substantial adverse effect on carrying out normal day-to-day activities, then if it ceases and recurs
then it is treated as continuing to have that effect.
Those who have been disabled in the past are also protected by the Act (there is no time constraint so it
does not matter that the earlier disability pre-dates the Act) on the basis that it would be inconsistent to
give protection to those who are currently impaired, but not to protect from discrimination on the very
same basis, those who have now recovered, particularly as part of the recovery process might be getting
them back into employment44. However, the definition of disability still applies to past disabilities; the
person still has to show that in the past they had a physical or mental impairment that had a substantial
and long-term adverse effect on their ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities.  
Knowledge of the disability 
As we have seen, disability discrimination protection has two arms. First there is a prohibition on direct
discrimination which in itself has two elements. It is absolutely prohibited to mete out less favourable
treatment on the ground of the disability; if the less favourable treatment is for a reason related to the
disability then this is prohibited unless the employer can justify it. Secondly, there is a duty to make
reasonable adjustments to accommodate the worker’s disability. In this case the Act specifically provides
that there is only a duty on the employer who knows or can be reasonably expected to know of the
disability. There is no specific requirement of ‘knowledge’ in the case of direct discrimination. In O’Neill
v Symm & Co Ltd45 the Employment Appeal Tribunal (“EAT”) held that it is not possible for an employer
to treat a person less favourably for a reason related to the disability without having actual or constructive
knowledge of the disability or its ‘material’ features. A differently constituted EAT in H J Heinz & Co Ltd
v Kenrick46 stated that the test is one of objective causation:  did the employer, in fact, act on the basis of
disability even if the disability or its material features were absent from the employer’s thinking? A
disability might not be apparent to the employer, but its manifestation might be. The decision of the Court
of Appeal in Clark v TDG Ltd t/a Novacold suggests, on the basis of statutory interpretation, that the latter
view is to be preferred, and that it is more probable that Parliament meant “the reason” for the treatment
to refer only to the facts constituting the reason for the treatment, and not to make the additional
requirement of a causal link with disability47.
43 B Doyle, Disability Discrimination: Law and Practice, 
(2005, Bristol: Jordans), p 27.
44 HL Deb vol 564, col 1655.
45 [1998] IRLR 233.
46 [2000] IRLR 144.
47 [1999] ICR 951, at 963.
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Models of disability and discrimination 
Disability – medical and social models
The definition of disability has raised both practical problems48 and the accusation that the UK is
following a ‘medical’ model of disability and not a ‘social’ model49. The debate on the two models goes
back to the 1980s when disabled people questioned the premise upon which disability rights were based50.
It assumed that disabled people suffered from some form of medical abnormality which meant that they
did not fit into the regular world upon whom they were then dependent for largesse of one kind or
another51. The ‘social’ model’s basic premise is that disabled people are disadvantaged because of society
placing unnecessary constraints upon their inclusion52. It is part of the view that successful, and powerful
people are largely white, male and able-bodied and that this profile dictates the terms upon which (inter
alia) disabled people can succeed in the employment field53.
The ‘individualised’ medical model is the predominant model, at least as far as the UK legislation is
concerned. The emphasis is on impairment of the individual; the test is whether the impairment has a
substantial effect upon that person’s ability to carry out day-to-day activities which are defined by
reference to the word ‘normal’. In Goodwin v The Patent Office it was stated that there should be no
attempt to define a day-to-day activity but that “it is not directed to the person’s own particular
circumstances, either at work or home”,54 and this implies that there are objective ‘normal’ activities.
Furthermore, it has been argued55 that the medical model is endemic in international conceptions of
disability, such as the World Health Organisation’s International Classification of Impairments,
Disabilities and Handicaps, which defines disability as: “any restriction or prevention of the performance
of an activity, resulting from an impairment, in the manner or within the range considered normal for a
human being” (emphasis added)56. As Barnes says, the medical model means that people with
impairments “become objects to be treated, changed, improved and made normal”57. This is reinforced
by the need for the individual disabled person to find another ‘individual’ with whom to compare
him/herself. On the other hand, a social model means that the focus is on the adaptation of attitudes,
social structures and the physical environment to accommodate people who do not fall into the mould58.
48 In 2002, the most common reason for the failure of claims
was the inability to satisfy the definition of ‘disability’
(Disability Rights Commission, Disability Equality:
Making it happen (2003, Disability Rights Commission) 
p64).
49 K Wells, “The Impact of the Framework Employment
Directive on UK Disability Discrimination Law” (2003)
32 No 4 ILJ 253 at 261.
50 E.g. The Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 
1970 and the publicity surrounding the United Nations
designation of 1981 as the International Year of Disabled
Persons.
51 This is exemplified by the fact that it was the World
Health Organisation that produced the International
Classification of Impairments, Disabilities and Handicaps
in 1980.
52 M Oliver Understanding Disability: From Theory to
Practice (1995, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
53 Ibid.
54 [1999] IRLR 7, at 7.
55 K Wells, “The Impact of the Framework Employment
Directive on UK Disability Discrimination Law” (2003)
32 No 4 ILJ 253
56 WHO 1980. (Sometimes language can be misleading: at
the same time as writers such as Oliver have been striving
to get away from society’s strictures on what is normal,
there  has also been a drive towards a process of
‘normalisation’, particularly towards those with learning
disabilities, which has, in effect, been trying to achieve the
same, see e.g. J O’Brien and A Tyne, The Principle of
Normalisation, (1981, London: Campaign for Mentally
Handicapped People).
57 C Barnes, Disabled People in Britain and Discrimination,
(1991, London: Hurst & Co) p24.
58 C Barnes “A Working Social Model? Disability, Work and
Disability Politics in the Twenty-First Century” (2000) 20
Critical Social Policy 221.
Mental Health and Discrimination in Employment
201
Tackling discrimination – individuals, groups, everyone
In the context of sex and race discrimination, Lacey distinguishes between individuals and groups,
pointing out that the individual norm is white and male (and in our case, not disabled), and further
distinguishes between group rights that claim the right to be different, and those that see the aim to
achieve remedial rights, where socio-economic disadvantage is the key59. Traditionally, disability rights
have fallen into the latter group, although it is arguable that the right to be different is the better route
as it has a more positive and empowering effect60. In the context of mental impairment this distinction is
interesting. The right to be different can be particularly compelling, particularly amongst, say, people in
creative jobs61. 
Fredman’s analysis of discrimination in the context of disability traces a progressive line from individual
to universal rights62. Stressing the rights of the individual, she argues is part of the liberal ethic of rational
self-interest that ignores more communitarian instincts and ignores the fact that individual merit is itself
a social construct, implying that the individual should fit the job and not the other way round. Moving
on to looking at minority group rights, she finds this inadequate, implying as it does discrete and insular
groups united by a defining characteristic: a model that is unsuited to impairment in all its disparate
forms. Fredman argues that universalism, where the range of the normal is widened and where differences
are respected will promote universal access to all activities. Clearly we are a long way from this at present
as both the Act itself and its interpretation63 emphasise the normal and the abnormal dichotomy.
Arguably, therefore, a social model of disability together with a universalist approach via the principle of
toleration, should be tempered by an approach that treats disabled people as non-disabled people should
be treated: as unique individuals.
Ill-health outside the Disability Discrimination Act 1995
The two main categories of people who are unprotected by the Act are those who have an existing health
problem but cannot satisfy the definition of disability, and those who have no health problems now but
who have had problems in the past (as we shall see, an issue of specific concern in relation to mental
health)64. Such people are unprotected unless they have at least one year’s qualifying employment to
enable them to bring claims for unfair dismissal. Unfair dismissal claims can be brought if employees are
dismissed on the basis that they are incapable of doing the job and in such circumstances the dismissal
may be fair65 as long as a fair procedure has been followed and as long as there is no other available job
within the organisation that the employee could reasonably have been offered66. There is also a possibility 
59 N Lacey “From Individual to Group?” in B Hepple and E
Szyszczak (eds) Discrimination: The Limits of the Law
(1992, London: Mansell Publishing Ltd). 
60 Note the potentially empowering effect of Marc Quinn’s
statue of a pregnant Alison Lapper in London’s Trafalgar
Square. Alison Lapper was born with no arms and
shortened legs due to a chromosomal condition called
Phocomelia. She was brought up in a care home and is
now a recognized artist who was awarded an MBE in
2003.  
61 See, e.g. a discussion of ‘the creative voice’ v ‘the psychotic
voice’ by Maxwell Steer at
http://msteer.co.uk/analytical/creativoxtext.html
62 S Fredman Disability Equality and the Existing Paradigm,
pp 203–208, in A Lawson and C Gooding (eds)
Disability Rights in Europe, (2005, Oxford: Hart).
63 See e.g. A v London Borough of Hounslow [2001] Emp
LR 1255.
64 O’Brien v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd  [1979] IRLR
140 EAT.
65 Section 98 (2)(a) Employment Rights Act 1996.
66 See e.g. Links, A  & Co Ltd v Rose [1991] IRLR 353 Ct
of Session.
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of claiming unfair constructive dismissal if the employer breaches a term of the contract67. This could be
a breach of an express term such as changing the job content or reducing pay, or it could be a case of
breaching an implied term such as that of the obligation to maintain trust and confidence68.
Nevertheless, until the 1995 Act, disabled workers had no protection qua disabled workers. The
provisions of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 mean that disabled workers are afforded some job
security in circumstances hitherto not available.
Ironically, the emphasis on a medical perspective in the Act, where protection is available from the time
of applying for a job, is absent when looking at ill-health in the workplace that does not amount to a
disability. Dismissal can take place on the basis that the employee is absent through ill-health and the
more the medical evidence suggests that the person is incapable of doing the job concerned, the easier it
is for an employer to dismiss. Only when the ‘ill-health’ is such as to amount to a disability does protection
kick in.
PART II – MENTAL HEALTH
Mental health and employment 
It is important to acknowledge that not only do people currently having mental health problems face
difficulties in employment, but that previous mental ill-health can continue to give rise to prejudice and
discrimination. There may, in the past,  have been some form of mental condition which was disordered
or thought to be disordered  and, therefore, in need of treatment. In this case it will form part of the
medical history of the person concerned about which s/he may be asked questions, either prior to being
engaged or, as an enquiry prior to being offered a formal contract69. The case of O’Brien v Prudential
Assurance Co70 illustrates the difficulties that can arise. Mr O’Brien had a history of mental illness which
included some hospitalisation, but at the time of making his job application he had not had any treatment
or symptoms for over four years. The company’s policy of not employing anyone with a history of mental
illness if (as in this case) they would be visiting people in their own homes was reflected by a question on
the application form and a question asked in person during the course of a pre-employment medical
examination. The question asked whether he had ever consulted a psychiatrist or suffered from nervous
or mental disorder. He answered in the negative, was offered and took the job and became respected for
his work. The following year he applied for life assurance with the company and consented to the
disclosure by his GP of his medical records. As a result of this disclosure he was dismissed on the advice
of the company’s senior medical adviser. Mr O’Brien’s previous problems were a matter of fact and the
suggestion that the tribunal should have taken into account the evidence of up to date medical evidence
to the effect that he was no longer ill was rejected, and the tribunal found that it was a fair dismissal as
the company policy was fair.
67 Section 95(1)(c) of the Employment Rights Act 1996
defines constructive dismissal as where: “the employee
terminates the contract under which he is employed (with
or without notice) in circumstances in which he is entitled
to terminate it without notice by reason of the employer’s
conduct.”
68 See Gogay v Hertfordshire County Council [2000] IRLR
703, where an unjustified suspension from duty caused
clinical depression and the claimant successfully claimed
damages for personal injury flowing from the breach of the
implied term.
69 See, for example, Farnsworth v London Borough of
Newham [2000] IRLR 691.
70 [1979] IRLR 140.
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Of course, O’Brien lost his job because of the dishonest response to a pre-employment enquiry. However,
it was admitted by the company that had Mr O’Brien revealed his history of mental illness, he would not
have been employed. The EAT said that if the employment had been of a different nature then it may
not have been justifiable, either in terms of the enquiry itself or in terms of enforcement to the point of
dismissal. O’Brien’s case is over 25 years old and although the approach may be different now, it is likely
that the same decision would be made. There is nothing to protect someone with a history of treatment
for a mental health condition if they choose not to reveal it. Paradoxically, under the Act, if they have an
existing rather than a past mental health condition they have a chance of bringing themselves within the
ambit of protection. 
Mental health – special considerations
Terminology in this area is fraught with difficulty. It is important to move away from the notion that all
mental ‘conditions’ that are not typical or conventional, are necessarily disabling, whilst at the same time
acknowledging the prejudice, fear and misunderstanding that exists in relation to people who might have
had treatment for a non-physical ‘disorder’71. The expression ‘disorder’ is problematic in itself, with its
implication some sort of order needs to be imposed or restored. Mental ‘illness’ often suggests psychosis72.
Further, none of these expressions is appropriate in cases of learning disabilities. I try, therefore, to use the
expression ‘mental health’, which has the disadvantage of medicalisation, but the advantage of referring
to the positive of health rather than the negative of a medical condition.
Mental health issues particularly point up the division between the medical and social models. Firstly,
mental health is harder to define than forms of physical health. It rarely has any physical manifestations
and it is inevitably bound up with the personality of the person concerned. A mental health atypicality
can be nothing more than a minor behavioural eccentricity,73 yet it can have a significant effect on the
person’s interaction with others (in our case, in the workplace) in a way in which a minor physical
atypicality would not even be noticed. Secondly, there might be concern that diagnosis of mental disorder
is more woolly and uncertain than in the case of physical conditions. However, there is no real evidence
for this save for the inevitable difficulty already mentioned that one’s mental state is also about one’s
personality. Thirdly, there is a fear that people can more readily fake or embellish mental disorder than
physical disorder and this has long been part of the debate in the context of civil liability for psychiatric
damage. However, the Law Commission has reported on this area and concluded that fraudulent or
exaggerated claims can be made in respect of physical conditions too and that this should not be a reason
for treating them differently74. Finally, mental conditions are often linked to dangerousness in the eyes of
the general public75. In this regard, note the O’Brien case and the policy of the insurance company in
71 “I had a cleaning job for three years, but when I
mentioned I had an appointment with a psychiatrist I
received a letter the next week to say my services were no
longer required.” This is quoted in J Read and S Baker
Not Just Sticks and Stones: A Survey of the Stigma,
Taboos and Discrimination experienced by People with
Mental Health Problems (1996, London: Mind) p 9.
72 The Mental Health Act 1983 does not define mental
illness, but many of the characteristics of psychosis were
included in a consultative document prior to the 1983 Act
(Department of Health and Social Security, Consultative
Document on the Mental Health Act 1959, (1976,
London:  HMSO)). 
73 A mild form of autism, say.
74 Law Commission Liability for Psychiatric Illness (1998,
London: The Stationery Office) para 6.7.
75 See National Centre for Social Research,  British Social
Attitudes Survey 2006/07 (2007: Sage Publications:
London).  It should also be noted that arguably the 
adverse publicity surrounding the Michael Stone case
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/uk/2001/michael_stone
_verdict/default.stm) was at least part of the impetus behind
the Government’s attempts to do something radical about
patients with personality disorder (see Home Office and
Department of Health Managing People with Severe
Personality Disorder (1999 Department of Health: London).
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excluding people who had received treatment for mental disorder from any jobs that entailed them
visiting customers at home.
Stigma and mental health
Stigma surrounding mental health issues arguably brings more socio-disadvantage than the problems that
arise for the physically impaired. Some who have physical impairments, such as mobility problems are
more acceptable in a social framework; the split between some of physically impaired people76 and
mentally impaired people is not unlike the split between the deserving and the undeserving poor that
originated in the Victorian workhouses77. Indeed statistics bear out the emphasis on disability being
associated with physical conditions78 and the fact that those with mental health problems are categorised
as being socially unworthy79. Yet despite this, it is acknowledged that even a period of short-term
depression can have a seriously adverse effect on people’s working life80.
Where the ‘social’ model of disability comes into its own is when examining issues of stigma, and, in
particular, past episodes of mental health problems that are likely to attract as much discrimination as a
current mental health problem, and, arguably, more so than a current physical health problem. These
stigmatising conditions are much more akin to other aspects of people that attract prejudice e.g. skin
colour, gender reassignment and so are deserving of exactly the sort of anti-discrimination protection that
these have81.
Mental health and the Disability Discrimination Act 1995
The definition of disability
As we have seen, a person is disabled for the purposes of the Act if “he has a physical or mental
impairment which has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on his ability to carry out normal day-
to-day activities” and this impairment must have lasted for at least 12 months or be reasonably expected
to last for at least that period or the rest of the person’s life. The earlier provision that mental impairment
had to arise from an illness which was ‘clinically well-recognised’ has now been removed to bring it into
line with physical impairments where there has never been any such requirement82. This had been
inserted on the basis that it would screen out “obscure conditions unrecognised by reputable clinicians”
76 It must nevertheless be acknowledged that some ‘shocking’
physical impairments can attract just as much stigma.
77 See D Lipsey “The National Wealth Service at
http://www.publicfinance.co.uk/opinion_details.cfm?News
_id=26224 
78 52% of those surveyed did not think of someone with
schizophrenia as being disabled, yet 31% regarded a
person with a broken leg as being disabled. National
Centre for Social Research,  British Social Attitudes
Survey 2006/07 (2007, London: Sage Publications).
79 Ibid. More than 70% of people surveyed said that they
would not feel comfortable living next door to someone
with schizophrenia, and half would not want someone 
with depression as a neighbour.  
80 Disability Rights Commission, Disability Equality: Making
it happen (2003, Disability Rights Commission), p23. See
also Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, Social Exclusion
Unit Mental Health and Social Exclusion (2004,
Wetherby: ODPM Publications), and G Thornicroft
Shunned – discrimination against people with mental
illness (2006, Oxford: Oxford University Press), 
Chapter 3.
81 ‘Stigma’ is well-recognised outside the context of
discrimination.  Defamation law depends upon its
existence (a defamatory statement can be one that causes
a claimant to be shunned and avoided; see Villers v
Monsley (1769) 95 ER 886) and it has crept into the
common law of employment, whereby a disadvantage on
the job market due to a stigmatising association, has been
held to be compensatable (Malik v Bank of Credit and
Commerce International SA (In Compulsory Liquidation)
[1997] 3 WLR 95).
82 Section 18 Disability Discrimination Act 2005. In
Dunham v Ashford Windows [2005] IRLR 608 the EAT
held that this requirement did not apply to learning
disabilities.
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or “moods and minor eccentricities”83. It will be suggested below that when this was re-examined by
Parliament there was a missed opportunity to reform radically the particular issues surrounding mental
health, and that the screening out of such things as minor eccentricities might not necessarily be wrong.
The DRC Review made two recommendations that are relevant for our purposes. Firstly, that the list of
normal day to day activities should be revised to include “the ability to communicate with others” and to
ensure that self-harming behaviour is covered84. These have not been acted upon. Secondly, the Review
recommended that for those whose day-to-day activities are substantially affected as a result of depression
the requirement that the effects last twelve months should be reduced to six months. They cited a
number of cases where claims had failed because of an inability to satisfy the twelve month rule, for
example, a case of a man who had attempted suicide and had his job offer withdrawn but whose claim
failed as he could not establish that the substantial effects of his depression were likely to last twelve
months or more85. This recommendation was not taken up when reforms were made. Direct
discrimination raises issues of stereotyping86. For people affected by mental health problems this is
particularly pertinent. As we have seen from the O’Brien case, protection is needed by people who have
a history of mental health problems. Unfortunately, the protection offered by the Act on recurring and
past disabilities still incorporates the definition of disability i.e. long term substantial adverse effect on
carrying out normal day-to-day activities, so many people with mental health problems e.g. clinical
depression, will not qualify as having a current, past or recurring disability.
Discussion
As was stated in the Report of the Social Exclusion Unit, paid employment improves self-esteem and that
can only have a beneficial effect upon mental illness87. The centrality of work to the lives of most of us
is well-recognised among labour lawyers. For example Blanpain states:
For the majority of citizens, work represents the best path to a meaningful way of life, affording them
access to the market of goods and services, offering the possibility of making a positive contribution to
their own family and to society at large, and providing enriched human contacts. It contributes to self-
development, to the development of the human personality and objective and subjective human culture.
In this view of things, unemployment comes to represent marginalization and exclusion. Indeed, work is 
a question of human dignity.88
Given this, and the well-recognised disadvantages experienced by those who have had some spell of
mental ill-health, and the even greater disadvantages of those workers or potential workers who have
existing mental health problems that might not come within the ambit of the Act, there is a strong
argument that, either the Act should be amended to take account of the special issues that have been
under discussion, or mental health should be treated as a separate category of discrimination protection.  
83 As per William Hague, HC Deb Standing Committee E,
col 71.
84 Disability Rights Commission, Disability Equality: Making
it happen (2003, Disability Rights Commission), p 66.
85 Compton v Bolton MBC, Manchester Case No
2400819/00.
86 E.g. assumptions about typical male and female behaviour
(see Alexander v Home Office [1988] 2 All ER 118 CA.
87 See also Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, Social
Exclusion Unit Mental Health and Social Exclusion
(2004 Wetherby: ODPM Publications) p 51.
88 R Blanpain, The Changing World of Work, in R Blanpain
and  C Engels Comparative Labour Law and Industrial
Relations in Industrialized Market Economies (1998, The
Hague: Kluwer Law International) p 23.
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Amending the Act
There might be considerable political resistance to extending the ambit of disability discrimination law.
However, such objections would have to contend with the fact that there are two defences available to a
claim:  justification, and refusal to make adjustments that are not reasonable. There is a parallel situation
in the context of indirect discrimination in other areas. For example, many employers can and do require
employees to work shifts or unsocial hours. This can immediately give rise to claims that these work
patterns have a disparate impact upon women who find it difficult to combine them with their traditional
role of carers. However, as long as the work patterns are a proportionate response to a legitimate need,
an employer has a defence. It is unfortunate, as has already been noted,89 that, from the perspective of
applicants this form of wording was not incorporated into the Act, but the fact remains that there are
defences available to employers.
The most obvious reform is to make a past or present diagnosis of a mental health problem or a
recognition of a learning disability, the same as a diagnosis of HIV or cancer. An objection could be raised
that it would not necessarily be linked to a present or even a recurring medical condition. However, given
that HIV is, in many cases, a ‘bare’ and symptom-free diagnosis, this objection is flawed. Furthermore, as
mentioned above, the inclusion of severe disfigurement in the Act does not sit with the functional
approach to disability, as there is no necessary connection between a person’s ability to carry out activities
of any sort and a disfigurement. There is, therefore, a precedent for such an inclusion.
It might be argued that to introduce this new category of protection would be to include an unacceptably
large number of people. However, currently a diagnosis of cancer is sufficient for someone to be disabled
under the Act90. This is despite the fact that many cancers are curable and many more are treatable over
a very long period of time without significant impingement on the working lives of the persons concerned.
Furthermore, one in three people will develop some form of cancer at some point in their lives91. The
incidence of mental health problems is considerably smaller, whereby one in ten will be diagnosed as
having a mental health problem and only a quarter of these will require specialist mental health
services92. There could be no principled opposition to including this new category unless we wish to
return to the deserving and the undeserving disabled dichotomy: people with cancer attract sympathy,93
but as we have seen many people with mental health problems are stigmatised.  
Furthermore, given that the proposal is to introduce a new special category of protection within the Act,
the requirement that the diagnosis be of a ‘well-recognised condition’ could be re-established, but without
the qualification that it must be ‘clinically’ recognised. Although the requirement was offensive in the
original Act because the requirement was not applied to physical conditions, in practice, the undesirable
results could be as a consequence of evidential problems in the conduct of specific litigation rather than
of an underlying failure of principle94. Nevertheless, some might argue that it reinforces the medical
model and that it harks back to the old accusations that malingering is easy and/or more prevalent in the
context of mental health. On the first point, it might well do this, but we have already established that
89 See the argument above under ‘Reasonable adjustments’.
90 Schedule I section 6A(2) gives the Secretary of State
power  to make regulations to exclude minor cancers.
91 See Cancer Research website:
http://info.cancerresearchuk.org/cancerstats/incidence/risk/
92 See the Mind website:
http://www.mind.org.uk/Information/Factsheets/Statistics/S
tatistics+.  
93 Although are not necessarily regarded as ‘disabled’ .
National Centre for Social Research, British Social
Attitudes Survey 2006/07 (2007, London: Sage
Publications).
94 As in Morgan v Staffordshire University [2002] IRLR
190, where the claim failed because there was no medical
report available, despite the disclosure of GP records
diagnosing depression and anxiety.
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the medical model is reflected by the Act and to reject a reform that might help those who suffer from a
prejudice95 is cutting off one’s medical nose to spite one’s social face. Furthermore, this disparity of
treatment could be dealt with by making the ‘well-recognised’ requirement apply to both physical and
mental impairment96.
Moreover, it is arguable that by treating mental health in terms of social disadvantage only, rather than
having had or currently experiencing a treatable condition on a par with a physical condition, one is being
patronising  and refusing to treat the persons concerned as being able to control and develop their own
lives97. In any event, those with physical conditions can fall foul of difficulties in diagnosis98.
The strongest argument, however, is one that disposes of the above argument and the suggestion that
malingering is easy where mental health is concerned. This is that well-recognised diagnostic criteria are
already implicit in the inclusion of HIV, cancer and multiple sclerosis at the point of diagnosis i.e. when
the recognised diagnostic criteria of these conditions have been satisfied.  
Arguably, it could be said that this is further pandering to the medical model. However, the expression
‘well-recognised’ is not restricted, either in physical or mental impairment, to ill-health models. It could
be clinically recognised or recognised by other means. Even under the old structure it was not necessary
for learning disabilities to be clinically well-recognised99 and some conditions require no medical
involvement at all, let alone a formal clinical diagnosis. No medical training is necessary to recognise the
fact that someone has no legs; nor would it be appropriate to regard such a person as being unhealthy.
The same can be said of disfigurement. The criticism inherent in the medical versus social models is that
there is a suggestion that the impaired person is abnormal and therefore only to be accommodated if
relatively easy to do so. On the other hand, Wells has argued that there has to be some form of
impairment, otherwise the protected group will extend to anyone who is socially disadvantaged100. Note,
however, that there is scope for a very wide interpretation of impairment, e.g. Mabbett has argued that
someone who has a skill deficiency caused by lack of educational facilities should be seen as having an
impairment101. Certainly, just as severe disfigurements can be regarded as impairments, so can
stigmatisation.
A new discrimination category?
A more radical proposal would remove mental health issues from the Act’s framework all together and
treat them as a separate category of discrimination. There is precedent for this in both the protection from
discrimination on the ground of gender reassignment and sexual orientation. Although the European
Court of Justice had specifically included gender reassignment as an aspect of sexuality that was protected
by European sex discrimination provisions102 the government made it clear beyond doubt by introducing
95 Of course the proposed reform is not just about protecting
against this prejudice; it is about protecting against those
who draw unjustifiable conclusions about a person’s
mental health such as the assumption of dangerousness.
96 Tribunals in any event emphasise the need for medical
evidence. See, for example, the Court of Appeal judgment
in McNicol v Balfour Beatty Rail Maintenance Ltd
[2002] EWCA at paragraph 26.
97 See N Cobb “Patronising the mentally disordered? Social
landlords and the control of ‘anti-social behaviour’ under
the Disability Discrimination Act 1995” (2006) Legal
Studies Vol 26 Issue 2 238, in which he argues that the
Act patronises the mentally disordered by overly protecting
them.
98 In Millar v Commissioners for HM Revenue and Customs
[2006] SC 155 the appellant’s claim failed when he could
not establish a physical cause of his physical symptoms.
99 Dunham v Ashford Windows [2005] IRLR 608.
100 K Wells, “The Impact of the Framework Employment
Directive on UK Disability Discrimination Law” (2003) 
32 No 4 ILJ 253 at 261. 
101 D Mabbett “Why have disability categories in social
security?” (2003) Benefits 11 (38) 163.  
102 P v S  [1996]  All ER (EC) 397.
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specific legislative protection103. This is a good example of a social inclusion of persons who may be
significantly stigmatised. Similarly, although the European Court would not interpret ‘sex’ to include
sexual orientation (inconsistently, but no doubt with policy in mind104) the subsequent Framework
Directive recognises that (inter alia) sexual orientation is a valid category for protection105. Gay people
suffer from prejudice and as a result can be disadvantaged in the workplace. To introduce a new mental
health protected interest has a particular resonance because of both the old medical106 and general social
attitudes towards homosexuality; it would be a further step away from flawed, prejudiced thinking.
The Government is concerned about social inclusion and has stated the aim of ensuring that health and
social services should promote mental health for all and should combat discrimination and social
exclusion associated with mental health problems107. There is no doubt that mental health problems can
exclude people from the mainstream of society and from rewarding and empowering work. This article
has suggested ways in which this might be avoided.
103 The Sex Discrimination (Gender Reassignment)
Regulations 1999 SI 1999/1102 inserted new s 2A and
7B into the Sex Discrimination Act 1975.
104 Grant v South-West Trains [1998] All ER (EC) 193. By
‘policy’ I mean that the court may well have had an eye on
the prevalence of homosexuality compared with that of
transsexualism.
105 EC Framework Directive 2000/78/EC, and the
Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations
2003 SI 2003/1661.
106 Until 1973, the American Psychiatric Association actually
classified homosexuality as a form of mental illness. See
http://www.psych.org/psych_pract/copptherapyaddendum8
3100.cfm
107 Standard 1, National Service Framework for Mental
Health: Modern Standards and Service Models (1999,
Department of Health).
